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Abstract
This article documents the efforts of Allen Dulles, upon his forced retirement from the
Central Intelligence Agency in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, to promote his former
agency in the face of mounting public criticism of its activities. It argues that the first
wave of critical press regarding the CIA in the early 1960s was an early indication of the
breakdown of the Cold War consensus – a phenomenon usually identified as occurring
later in the decade in response to the escalation of the Vietnam War. Dulles, who as
head of the CIA for most of the 1950s relied upon a compliant media to maintain the
CIA’s anonymity in public life, was confronted by an increasingly recalcitrant American
media in the following decade that were beginning to question the logics of government
secrecy, CIA covert action and US foreign policy more generally. In this respect the Bay
of Pigs and the media scrutiny of the CIA and US foreign policy that it inspired can be
regarded as an early precursor to the later emergence of adversarial journalism and a
post-consensus American culture that contested the Vietnam War and America’s
conduct in the Cold War more generally.
The very word ‘secrecy’ is repugnant in a free and open society; and we
are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to
secret oaths and to secret proceedings . . . [T]here is little value in oppos-
ing the threat of a closed society by imitating its arbitrary restrictions . . .
But I do ask every publisher, every editor, and every newsman in the
nation to reexamine the nature of our country’s peril. In time of war, the
government and the press have customarily joined in an effort based
largely on self-discipline, to prevent unauthorized disclosures to the
enemy . . . For the facts of the matter are that this nation’s foes
have openly boasted of acquiring through our newspapers information
they would otherwise hire agents to acquire through theft, bribery or
espionage . . .
President John F. Kennedy, Address before the
American Newspaper Publishers Association, 27 April 1961
(seven days after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion)
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Even before the exiles were on the beach, Castro could read about them
in the American newspapers. On 7 April 1961, ten days before the Bay
of Pigs invasion, the New York Times ran a story on its front page that
reported the build-up of Cuban exile forces in Florida and Guatemala
preparing for an imminent attack.1 The article’s author, Tad Szulc,
picked up his scoop in ‘the strange atmosphere of Miami, bulging with
refugees and revolutionaries’ where, as he wrote, ‘the preparations
against Dr. Castro is [sic] an open secret. They are discussed in the
streets, Cuban cafes and restaurants and almost everywhere that two or
more Cubans congregate. Local newspapers openly refer to incidents in
the [exile training] camps.’ Apparently patronizing the same Cuban
restaurants, the CBS news correspondent in Miami, Stuart Novins,
reported on 5 April on World Tonight that ‘plans for an invasion of
Cuba were in their final stages.’2 Karl Meyer, Latin America correspon-
dent at the Washington Post, also picked up the same story and pub-
lished it under a pseudonym in the New Republic.3
These reports were preceded months earlier by details in the Ameri-
can press of the Cuban exile training camps in Guatemala. The Nation
had mentioned them in November 1960 and the Los Angeles Times and
The New York Times followed with similar stories in January 1961.4
News reports continued unabated right up to and even during the
invasion, revealing key operational details to the Cubans. This unprec-
edented coverage of a CIA covert operation helped dissuade President
Kennedy from providing sustained air support to the rebels, thus sealing
their fate. Szulc’s sceptical response to the US government’s attempts to
pass off the pre-invasion bombing of Castro’s airbases as the work of
escaped Cuban pilots, for example, helped convince Kennedy to make
the fateful decision to cancel the second round of airstrikes.5 Long
before American media coverage of the Vietnam War turned the tide of
public opinion against it, the press played a decisive role in helping to
bring about the premature operational failure, for good or ill, of an
American Cold War misadventure.
Some scholars have downplayed the significance of the press criticism
of the CIA in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, arguing that it was
‘mostly covered over by the blanket of Cold War consensus’.6 This was
certainly true of the decade preceding the Bay of Pigs, a period in which
the CIA controlled both the manner and the timing of its institutional
1 Tad Szulc, ‘Anti-Castro units trained to fight at Florida bases’, New York Times, 7 April 1961.
2 Stuart Novins cited ibid.
3 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘American journalism and the landscape of secrecy: Tad Szulc, the CIA and
Cuba’, in this volume.
4 See ibid., p. 190 n. 3.
5 David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government (New York, 1964), pp. 17–20.
6 Tity de Vries, ‘The 1967 Central Intelligence Agency scandal: catalyst in transforming the
relationship between state and people’, Journal of American History, 98/4 (2012), pp. 1075–92, at p.
1076. See also Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investi-
gations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996).
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publicity.7 The CIA’s involvement in the Iranian and Guatemalan coups
in 1953 and 1954, for example, went almost entirely unreported in the
press.8 Indeed, the first time extensive details of these two formative
CIA covert operations leaked out was, with Director of Central Intel-
ligence (DCI) Allen Dulles’s blessing, in Richard Harkness and Gladys
Harkness’s three-part encomium of the CIA, published in the Saturday
Evening Post in 1954.9 For the most part, however, as an internal history
of CIA public relations activities recalled, ‘often as much time [during
the 1950s] was spent deflecting media queries with the standard “no
comment,” as answering them’.10 During an age of consensus the CIA
could afford to remain reticent. The so-called ‘golden age’ of covert
action was facilitated by a complaisant media who acquiesced in the
CIA’s polite requests for anonymity.11
The Bay of Pigs, by contrast, inspired a wave of critical articles,
books, TV documentaries, radio shows and many other forms of media
exposure that brought CIA covert action to widespread public attention
for the first time, and often in a critical light. In this respect the claim by
Tity de Vries, that it was not until the Ramparts Magazine revelations in
1967 that the CIA ‘found itself under heavy fire’ by the media for the
first time in its history, is misleading.12 In 1962 Andrew Tully, for
example, published the first widely read history of the CIA to appear in
the United States; it included a chapter entitled ‘Catastrophe in Cuba’.13
7 The most notorious aspect of the CIA’s extensive relationship with journalists during the 1950s
was Operation Mockingbird: a covert campaign by the CIA to maintain a network of journalists
within both the American and foreign press. For more on this, as well as the wider consensus that
existed between the CIA and the American media in the 1950s see Hugh Wilford, The Mighty
Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge, MA, 2008), pp. 225–48.
8 John Foran, ‘Discursive subversions: Time Magazine, the CIA overthrow of Mussadiq, and the
installation of the Shah’, in Christian G. Appy (ed.), Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture
of U.S. Imperialism (Amherst, 2000), pp. 157–82.
9 Richard Harkness and Gladys Harkness, ‘The mysterious doings of the CIA’, Saturday Evening
Post, 30 Oct. 1954; Richard Harkness and Gladys Harkness, ‘The mysterious doings of the CIA’,
Saturday Evening Post, 6 Nov. 1954; Richard Harkness and Gladys Harkness, ‘The Mysterious
Doings of the CIA’, Saturday Evening Post, 11 Nov. 1954. The background to the articles and the
extent of the CIA’s assistance to the authors is detailed in David Shamus McCarthy, ‘The CIA and
the cult of secrecy’, unpublished PhD thesis, William and Mary College, 2008, pp. 101–3.
10 Public Affairs Advisory Group Fact Sheet, undated though likely produced in 1978–79, CIA
Records Search Tool [hereafter CREST], CIA-RDP86B00985R000100030010-8, US National
Archives, College Park, MD.
11 When a television producer asked DCI Walter Bedell Smith about the possibility of producing
a series about American espionage in cooperation with the CIA, he was politely informed ‘that the
C.I.A. deliberately cherish anonymity’. The TV producer in question respectfully acceded to
Smith’s request – ‘[w]e understand and respect your viewpoint and have taken immediate steps to
delete all references from the script. In summing up, I am sorry that I cannot think of anything
more brilliant to say, than the time-worn bromide – “you can’t blame a fellow for trying”.’
See Eugene B. Rodney to General Walter Bedell Smith, 8 Aug. 1951, CREST, CIA-
RDP80R01731R003100150019-6.
12 De Vries, ‘The 1967 Central Intelligence Agency scandal’, p. 1076.
13 Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York, 1962), pp. 243–56. A British Marxist, Gordon
Stewart, wrote the first history of the CIA in 1953: Gordon Stewart, Cloak and Dollar War
(London, 1953). For a more detailed discussion of this and other early histories of the CIA see
Richard J. Aldrich, ‘CIA History as a Cold War Battleground: The Forgotten First Wave of
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Tad Szulc’s book on the Bay of Pigs appeared the same year, and in
1964 journalist Haynes Johnson published a more sympathetic, though
no less revelatory, account that was told from the point of view of the
Cuban exiles.14
But by far the most significant milestone in this first substantive wave
of critical press for the Agency was David Wise and Thomas Ross’s The
Invisible Government.15 Published in 1964, Wise and Ross’s bestselling
critique of the CIA – and US government secrecy more generally –
opened with four damning chapters on the Bay of Pigs. Its central
thesis, indicated by the title, was that the Agency had grown so power-
ful, and its special operations had become so out of control, that it
constituted a ‘government-within-a-government’, largely unaccountable
to the American people and with ‘quasi-independent status’.16 As John
Prados argues, The Invisible Government ‘would be considered pretty
tame fare today’, but in 1964, before the anti-war movement had gath-
ered momentum, before the Tet Offensive swung American public
opinion against the Vietnam War and generated a profound and wide-
spread questioning of American foreign policy, Wise and Ross’s book
marked a significant early milestone in the erosion of consensus by the
burgeoning fissures of dissent.17
The growing public unease regarding the activities of the CIA
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which began in the aftermath of the
Bay of Pigs and culminated with the series of Congressional investiga-
tions of CIA misdeeds in the mid-1970s, were centrally significant to the
break-up of the Cold War consensus. Though the effects of the socio-
political fragmentation of America during the 1960s were complex and
far-reaching (so much so that it is often regarded as the crucible of an
entirely new epoch in American history and culture: postmodernity), the
cause, at least as far as public faith in American foreign policy was
concerned, was relatively simple: the American people, en masse,
stopped trusting their government.18 The intellectual defenders of the
liberal consensus, people like Richard Hofstadter who published his
seminal essay ‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics’ in Harper’s
Magazine the same year as The Invisible Government, regarded the
increasing political paranoia that accompanied the widening credibility
Agency Narratives’, in Christopher Moran and Christopher Murphy (eds), Intelligence Studies in
Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945 (Edinburgh, 2013), pp. 19–46.
14 Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York, 1962); Tad Szulc and Robert E. Meyer, The
Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster (New York, 1962).
15 Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government.
16 John Prados, The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power (Austin, 2013), p.
205.
17 See for example the chapter on The Invisible Government in Tom Engelhardt, The End of Victory
Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation, revised edition (Amherst, 2007),
pp. 181–6.
18 For statistical analysis of the decline in American public trust in government, see ‘Public trust
in government’, Pew Research Center for People and the Press [webpage], 13 Nov. 2014, <http://
www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/> [accessed 20 Nov. 2014].
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gap in the 1960s and beyond as a dangerous socio-psychological pathol-
ogy that threatened the great traditions of pluralism, pragmatism and
the existence of a rational public sphere that they regarded as vital
prerequisites for the healthy functioning of American democracy.19 But
as more recent challenges to this Hofstadterian paradigm have argued,
the heightened suspicions of this era were not without foundation.20 For
there was another more recent tradition of American government that
for the first time in the 1960s fell under considerable and sustained
scrutiny by the American media: secrecy.
After the Bay of Pigs the CIA became a lightning rod for the public’s
wider anxieties regarding US government secrecy. It became a ‘symbol
of public unknowing’, as Timothy Melley writes, and as a result, its
public mythos, which began to take shape in the aftermath of the Bay of
Pigs, exerted a profound influence on American culture – even to the
point, as Melley implies, of provoking the epistemological crisis (or the
collapse of trust in all forms of ‘official’ or authoritative knowledge)
that precipitated the onset of postmodernity. ‘The skepticism about the
possibility of disinterested knowledge and language that postmodernism
sponsors . . .’, writes Ann Douglas, ‘makes most sense when taken as a
straightforward description of the extremes of official dishonesty char-
acteristic of the cold war era.’21 It is no coincidence that the CIA
features prominently in so many archetypally ‘postmodern’ novels.
Indeed Don DeLillo, a canonical postmodern author, has gone so far as
to describe the CIA as ‘America’s myth’.22
The ambitions of this article are more modest than this positioning of
the Agency’s myth, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, as a cen-
trally symbolic cultural hieroglyph of postmodernity. Rather, it takes as
its focus the attempts by Allen Dulles, upon his forced retirement from
his position as head of the CIA after the Bay of Pigs, to paper over the
cracks of those burgeoning fissures in America’s Cold War consensus by
promoting his former Agency to an increasingly suspicious American
19 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York,
2008), pp. 3–40.
20 Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture (Minneapolis,
2008); Timothy Melley, The Covert Sphere: Secrecy, Fiction, and the National Security State
(Ithaca, 2012); Kathryn Olmsted, Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy,
World War I to 9/11 (Oxford, 2009).
21 Ann Douglas, ‘Periodizing the American century: modernism, postmodernism and
postcolonialism in the Cold War context’, Modernism/Modernity, 5/3 (1998), pp. 71–98, at p. 76.
Cited in Melley, The Covert Sphere, p. 36.
22 Don DeLillo, The Names (New York, 1982), p. 317. For an excellent discussion of Don
DeLillo’s fiction as a postmodern challenge to traditional historical representation, functioning in
terms of what Linda Hutcheon described as a ‘historiographical metafiction’, which challenges the
historical profession’s claims to an unmediated access to a past reality, see Thomas Carmichael,
‘Lee Harvey Oswald and the Postmodern Subject: History and Intertextuality in Don Delillo’s
Libra, The Names, and Mao II’, Contemporary Literature, 34/2 (1993), pp. 204–18. For an analysis
of Don DeLillo’s discussion of the CIA in The Names, and the power and mythology of the CIA
as an acronym in DeLillo’s fiction see Dennis A. Foster, ‘Alphabetic pleasures: “the names” ’, in
Frank Lentricchia (ed.), Introducing Don DeLillo (Durham, NC, 1999), pp. 157–74.
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public. And yet, the growing recalcitrance – or worse, the disinterested-
ness – with which Dulles’s frequent advocacy of the CIA in this period
was met, is suggestive of those wider shifts in the public’s and the
media’s attitude towards secrecy, the CIA and US foreign policy
that were both the cause and the consequence of the breakdown of
consensus.
Dulles’s penchant for publicity, however, stood in marked contrast to
the approach of his former Agency. During his tenure as head of the
CIA Dulles had carefully promoted the CIA’s reputation through con-
trolled leaks and by agreeing to talk to sympathetic journalists. Never-
theless, reticence remained the most common strategy in the face of
media scrutiny. After Dulles’s retirement, the CIA attempted to respond
to the rising tide of criticism of their activities by plugging the dyke with
draconian measures. For example, having covertly obtained galleys of
The Invisible Government and Haynes Johnson’s Bay of Pigs account
prior to their publication, Langley appealed to Deputy Attorney
General Nicolas Katzenbach to prevent their release. New DCI John
McCone even met with Wise and Ross who demanded certain excisions
and threatened Random House editor Robert Loomis with espionage
charges. The threats fell on deaf ears. Exasperated, McCone’s last-ditch
plot was to purchase all 20,000 copies of the book’s first run.23 Random
House, however, remained resolute in its promise to deliver Wise and
Ross’s critical history of the Agency into the hands of the American
people. Finally, upon its release, McCone authorized the crafting of a
critical book review that could be placed in the foreign press.24 The
Invisible Government and Haynes Johnson’s Bay of Pigs account were
not the only books the CIA would try, and fail, to censor in this brave
new post-consensus era. As John Prados has documented, the Agency
continued throughout the decade to try to undermine critical publica-
tions with punitive measures – a particular bête noire was the Kennedy
assassination conspiracy theories that flooded the market in the latter
half of the decade and traded off the widening credibility gap that
America’s increasingly contested foreign policy inspired. The Agency
evidently had not been reading its Greek mythology: once Pandora’s
box was opened, the lid could not be sealed shut.
The now-retired Allen Dulles, who preferred the legend of Troy to
the myth of Pandora because it leant the weight of antiquity to his
advocacy of American intelligence and covert operations, nevertheless
still understood, unlike his former Agency, that the Bay of Pigs marked
a turning point in the history of CIA public relations. After the men
were on the beach, the CIA could no longer rely on an overwhelmingly
compliant American media to acquiesce in their polite requests for
anonymity whilst still encouraging the occasional beneficial publication.
23 Stanton Peckham, ‘Reader’s roundup’, Denver Post, 28 June 1964.
24 Prados, The Family Jewels, pp. 203–5.
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The CIA was now a celebrity, and like all celebrities, the battle to
safeguard its reputation required continuous media engagement. Under-
standing this, Dulles, perhaps just as concerned with his own individual
legacy as the CIA’s – although the two had always been contingent
upon one another during his tenure – embarked in his retirement upon
a public relations campaign to promote his former Agency. What he
could not anticipate, however, is how far America had ebbed, and
particularly the American media, from an age of consensus that marked
his post-war intelligence career, towards an age of dissent that con-
fronted him in retirement. For the first time, the assumptions that
undergirded the so-called ‘golden age’ of covert action came under
heavy fire from the American media. With it, the mythical edifice that
had perpetuated the belief that, as Bradley Smith put it, America ‘could
retain superpower status cheaply . . . [by] making its central intelligence
agency into something that it hoped could produce shadow warfare
magic’, began to erode. President Kennedy, an avid reader of the James
Bond novels, had authorized the CIA’s invasion plans in part because
he believed in that myth. He was not alone in this belief; before April
1961, it was a myth that, for the most part, went entirely unchallenged.
‘The system’, as novelist Don DeLillo later characterized it, ‘would
perpetuate itself in all its curious and obsessive webbings, its equivoca-
tions and patient riddles and levels of delusional thought, at least until
the men were on the beach . . . After the Bay of Pigs, nothing was the
same.’25
I
A month after his retirement, on New Year’s Eve 1961, Dulles gave an
interview to NBC’s Meet the Press – the first of numerous appearances
during his retirement to defend his increasingly embattled former
agency. Though refusing to be drawn at any length on Cuba, he did
raise the issue of the unique time pressures he and his agency were
under: knowing Castro’s pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia,
and that Soviet MIGs were on their way to Cuba, he argued that the
United States had a window of six months between November 1960 and
April 1961 to overthrow Castro via means less than full-scale war. This
unique time pressure, Dulles implied, might in part explain some of the
failures in the planning and execution of the operation.26
25 Don DeLillo, Libra (New York, 2006), p. 22. Alan Nadel identifies the Bay of Pigs as the
beginning of the end of the Cold War consensus. He argues that the failed invasion precipitated a
loss of faith in the authority of the official story, with its straightforward binary narratives of the
Cold War, and in so doing paved the way for the postmodern scepticism of the proceeding decade.
See Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age
(Durham, NC, 1995), pp. 157–203. For more on the relationship between US government secrecy,
postmodernism and the breakdown of consensus see Melley, The Covert Sphere.
26 ‘Dulles gives timing on Cuba invasion’, New York Times, 1 Jan. 1962; Interview with Allen
Dulles, Meet the Press, National Broadcasting Company (NBC), 31 Dec. 1961, Television.
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Dulles repeated this defence a few months later, on the anniversary of
the invasion, in an extended interview for a CBS special report entitled
The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles.27 The interview, conducted by
the esteemed ‘Murrow boy’ Eric Sevareid, was a prime example of
consensus journalism, and can be entered as evidence in support of the
view that the post-Bay of Pigs criticism of the Agency was covered
over by consensus. Most of Sevareid’s questions could have been lifted
from a Dulles press release. They covered the familiar and flattering
territory of Dulles’s wartime OSS career, including his leading role in
Operation Sunrise and the comic incident when Khrushchev met Dulles
and joshed that they both read all the same reports (an anecdote Dulles
enjoyed telling frequently). At the end of the interview Sevareid also
asked whether the CIA was responsible for leaking Khrushchev’s
de-stalinization speech – to which Dulles smugly replied that he was
‘willing to accept that charge’. Dulles even blamed the fallout from the
Gary Powers affair on Khrushchev, arguing that the Soviet premier had
long known of the U-2 programme’s existence and had feigned outrage
and cancelled the Paris summit in order to cause confusion and division
among the western powers.
One rather unorthodox analysis of US foreign policy that Dulles did
offer concerned the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Dulles had been privy to intelligence from Japanese cables
towards the end of the war that suggested Japan was on the brink of
surrender. As a result he travelled to the Potsdam conference to advise
President Truman on his fateful decision. Though Dulles admitted pro-
found respect for ‘the men who made that decision’, he added that
‘there was a failure to interpret available intelligence as to the extent of
the Japanese collapse, and of their inability to effectively carry on the
war.’ It was a remarkable claim – one that corroborated some of the
arguments of the nascent Cold War revisionists – particularly as Dulles
came from the heart of the American foreign policy establishment.
Nevertheless, it was an analysis that once again underlined the impor-
tance of accurate intelligence and the perilous consequences when
policymakers misinterpret that intelligence. But there was another
related lesson that Dulles wished to impart from this example: that it
was/is the President, for good or ill, who dictates the course of Ameri-
can foreign policy.
In the case of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy and Dulles, on the face of
things at least, were in agreement: Kennedy had indeed accepted public
responsibility for the debacle and allowed Dulles a ‘decent interval’ after
the event before forcing him into retirement. But, as Rhodri Jeffreys-
Jones has argued, Kennedy’s mea culpa, though superficially noble, was
also a canny exercise in damage limitation, and the opening foray in a
27 The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), 26 April 1962,
Television.
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protracted battle between Kennedy, Dulles and his former Agency
implicitly to ascribe culpability for the failed invasion. ‘Victory has
a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan’, Kennedy famously
ruminated to the press; in so doing he ‘gently prodded the speculation’
that Kennedy had fallen on his sword to save the Agency.28
Sevareid began his line of questioning on the Bay of Pigs by asking
Dulles whether, like the British in the case of Buster Crabb, the US
could have simply refused to acknowledge the incident.29 The previous
month James Bond author Ian Fleming had penned an article in The
Sunday Times criticizing the United States government for sacrificing
what he termed ‘The Big Lie’ for the sake of Gary Powers. He should be
thrown ‘cold bloodedly to the dogs’, the British author concluded in
characteristically sadistic fashion, ‘He was expendable. Expend him! . . .
If the Big Lie had been spoken, and stuck to, it would have been in the
true traditions of espionage.’30 For once, Dulles disagreed with his
friend Fleming, who had done so much to help Dulles promote Ameri-
can intelligence.31 ‘I doubt’, Dulles replied, ‘one could have rested on the
answer “no comment” ’ in the U-2 and Cuban incidents. ‘It seems to
me’, contemplated Dulles, pausing ruminatively as he struck a match to
his trademark pipe, ‘It seems to me it would have raised an even more
serious problem than the problem of disclosing intelligence operations,
namely, the problem of responsibility in government.’ Asked to clarify
his meaning, Dulles explained that it was important that the American
people understood that such major foreign policy actions, with the
potential to cause what he termed ‘international complications’, were
authorized by the President. If it were thought otherwise, Dulles specu-
lated, it would cause a great ‘uneasiness’ among the American people
towards their government.
He was right: though such ‘unease’ was already present in American
society when he gave the interview, with the publication of Wise and
Ross’s The Invisible Government a few years later, which itself followed
Kennedy’s assassination and America’s increasing entanglement in
Vietnam, that unease began to drive a wedge between the US foreign
policy-making establishment and the American people. In short order
the CIA would become a lightning rod for the public discontent gener-
ated by that unease. The fragmentation of the Cold War consensus, a
process that the Bay of Pigs had begun, spelt disaster for the CIA’s
public reputation. Perhaps sensing this, Dulles ended the interview with
28 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 3rd edn (New Haven, 2003), p. 127.
29 For more on the British response to the Buster Crabb Affair see Christopher Moran, ‘Intelli-
gence and the media: the press, government secrecy and the “Buster” Crabb Affair’, Intelligence
and National Security, 26/5 (2011), pp. 676–700.
30 Ian Fleming, ‘Gary Powers and the Big Lie, Sunday Times, 11 March 1962.
31 For more on the relationship between Allen Dulles and Ian Fleming and their combined efforts
to promote the CIA, see Christopher Moran, ‘Ian Fleming and the public profile of the CIA’,
Journal of Cold War Studies, 15/1 (2013), pp. 119–46.
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a plea for the American people to preserve the consensus: ‘We must all
rally together in support of the action our government has taken to
defend our positions where they are threatened by communism: in
Berlin, Laos, Vietnam, wherever it may be.’
II
Dulles continued to make frequent television appearances throughout
the 1960s, not all of which were as amicable as his interview with
Sevareid. Often, he was asked to appear as a general expert on intelli-
gence and foreign policy, rather than simply to address matters specific
to the CIA. He appeared, for example, alongside the famous theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr on the ‘Prospects for Mankind’ series, hosted by
Eleanor Roosevelt, to discuss the Sino-Soviet split.32 He appeared as a
guest on Issues and Answers in the summer of 1963 and a month later
was interviewed on the subject of defection for a documentary on
Lowell Skinner, a voluntary non-repatriate from the Korean War.33
Dulles’s rising ‘expert’ status on all intelligence-related matters led to
the Encyclopaedia Britannica asking him to write the entry on ‘intelli-
gence’. The 41,000-word article became the basis for his book-length
treatment of the subject, The Craft of Intelligence. It was to prove a
controversial publication – not only for the increasingly vocal oppo-
nents of the Agency, but also for those within the CIA itself who were
perturbed by the prospect of their former chief jeopardizing their
coveted anonymity.
With The Craft of Intelligence Dulles sought, as he put it, to place
intelligence ‘in its proper perspective’.34 Part memoir, part instructional
guide, it aimed to facilitate public ‘understanding’ of the role and func-
tion of intelligence in America from an insider’s perspective. In reality,
however, the book was not of Dulles’s making alone, but ghost-written
by a team of current and former CIA officers led by Howard Roman,
who took unpaid leave for an entire year to work on the book.35 Reject-
ing the argument of Wise and Ross, among others, that the CIA and
secret intelligence represented an affront to American democratic tradi-
tions of openness and accountability, Dulles sought to establish a ven-
erable tradition for espionage. All the familiar touchstones were
included, from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War to George Washington’s use
of spies during the American Revolution. In a tenuous historical paral-
lel, Dulles even linked the dangers of contemporary policy-makers
ignoring their intelligence officials with the ancient Greek mythology of
32 Prospect of Mankind, National Educational Television, 11 Feb. 1962, Television.
33 Issues and Answers, American Broadcasting Network (ABC), 30 June 1963; VNR: The True
Story of Lowell Skinner, WNEW-TV, 18 Aug. 1963.
34 Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York, 1963), p. 258.
35 ‘Memorandum for the DCI’, 11 July 1963, CREST, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090034-3.
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Troy. Had the prophecies (read intelligence) of Cassandra been heeded,
then the fall of Troy might have been avoided.36
Dulles’s appeal to tradition was a well-established CIA public
relations tactic, and remains so today. William Donovan, for example,
in the course of his advocacy for the establishment of the CIA in the
aftermath of the dissolution of the OSS, had encouraged Dulles to
‘spread the story that because George Washington employed some
irregular means of warfare, the Father of the Country had been a
pioneer in the use of O.S.S.-type operations’.37 Dulles had evidently
absorbed Donovan’s advice when he came to write The Craft of
Intelligence. Likewise William Casey, DCI under Reagan and author
of a history of the American Revolution which naturally discusses
George Washington’s intelligence activities in some length, told a
Senate committee: ‘I claim that my first predecessor as Director of
Central Intelligence was . . . George Washington, who appointed
himself.’38 Today the CIA’s website contains an entire section devoted
to supporting Casey’s genealogy, and their recently established twitter
account has likewise repeated the claim.39 Such appeals to the
founding fathers as justification for contemporary CIA activities is, as
Jeffreys-Jones points out, both ‘presentist’, ‘allowing contemporary
concerns to overshadow the different agendas of Washington and his
successors’, and ‘originalist’, ‘in that they give the Founding Fathers
an iconic status and imply that Washington, slave owner, could do no
wrong’.40 Still, Casey’s claim convinced at least one major intelligence
historian. Christopher Andrew repeats Casey’s statement to the Senate
parrot-fashion in the opening paragraph to his seminal history of
American intelligence before setting about validating his analysis
with a long and continuous narrative of American intelligence, which,
as Bernard Porter argues, supposes ‘espionage is both necessary and
“natural” ’ and in so doing seeks ‘both to excuse and to explain’ the
secret state.41
In a scathing review of The Craft of Intelligence, Soviet journalist L.
Rovinsky mocked the way in which Dulles provided ‘a new interpreta-
36 Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, pp. 1–17.
37 Bradley Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (London, 1983),
p. 411.
38 William Casey, Where and How the War Was Fought: An Armchair Tour of the American
Revolution (New York, 1976); Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret
Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, 1996), p. 1.
39 ‘Intelligence in the War of Independence’, Central Intelligence Agency [webpage], 15 March
2007, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/intelligence> [accessed 10 Nov. 2014]; ‘General George Washington: America’s 1st
Intelligence Chief’, @CIA Twitter Account, 27 June 2014, <https://twitter.com/CIA/status/
482319919644561408> [accessed 10 Nov. 2014].
40 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence, 2nd edn
(New Haven, 2003), p. 23.
41 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 1; Bernard Porter, Plots and Paranoia: A History of
Political Espionage in Britain, 1790–1988 (London 1992), p. 1.
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tion of practically all the major events of history’.42 A further bone of
contention for Rovinsky was the book’s almost complete failure to
mention covert action, despite selling itself as a comprehensive guide to
what intelligence agencies do. Thus it covered all functional aspects of
the intelligence cycle including: collection, analysis, dissemination,
counterintelligence and deception, before dwelling at length on the men-
dacious activities of the KGB. The failure to include covert action,
particularly following his forced resignation after the Bay of Pigs, was a
fundamentally misleading omission. Indeed, The Craft of Intelligence
contains only a single reference to the failed Cuban expedition that
alludes to the ‘myths’ put about by the media’s coverage of the event.43
Yet despite Dulles’s cautious and highly selective summary of Ameri-
can intelligence, early drafts of the book inspired consternation from
some within the CIA who were still wedded to a culture of absolute
secrecy. Stanley Grogan, head of CIA public affairs, summarized a
pre-publication copy of Dulles’s book to the new CIA chief, John
McCone, with a series of acerbic annotations. His report began with a
quote from Dulles’s advanced uncorrected proof indicating the hypoc-
risy of his account: ‘every employee signs an oath which binds him not
to divulge anything he learns or does in the course of his employment to
any unauthorized person’, admitted Dulles, ‘and this is binding even
after he may have left government employment’. ‘Contrast this’, urged
the clearly irritated Grogan, ‘with the preface to Mr. Dulles’ proposed
book’ that included the promise of ‘a wealth of personal anecdote’ and
details of ‘how intelligence is collected and processed . . . methods of
confusing the adversary, of surveillance and the usefulness of defectors
from hostile nations’. It also promised to reveal some of ‘the techniques
of modern espionage’ and provided an official acknowledgement of the
CIA’s role in the Bay of Pigs that was evidently deleted in the final
draft.
Grogan recommended a number of excisions, including the removal
of intelligence assessments of the Suez Crisis, information on the use of
double agents, discussions of the U-2 programme, details of communi-
cations intelligence and ‘a method of “negative guidance” ’. Some of the
recommended deletions remain classified to this day, demonstrating just
how far Dulles was prepared to go in sacrificing secrecy for the benefit
of public relations. Grogan, however, whom Dulles had appointed, did
not agree with Dulles’s predilection towards positive disclosure:
Dulles mentions successes and states: ‘But it is not wise to advertise these
cases of the resources used,’ he has told a great deal in prior pages . . . Mr
Dulles well states: ‘After all, what a government, or the Press, tells the
people, it also automatically tells its foes.’ This is also true in this book by
Mr. Dulles . . . [T]his book, with its many anecdotes, will open up the
42 L. Rovinsky, ‘American Cassandra’, New Times, no. 3, 1964.
43 Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, pp. 186–7.
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flood gates to all CIA employees to write or speak of their experiences to
the same degree and in the same manner as does Mr. Dulles, some with
their eye on a Hollywood series on espionage, which will bring them a pot
of gold.44
III
Dulles next fell foul of his publicity-shy former Agency when he
appeared, along with Bay of Pigs architect Richard Bissell, in an NBC
television documentary entitled The Science of Spying in May 1965. It
was produced by Ted Yates, a ‘mythic figure’ whose interest in the
shady underbelly of American foreign relations often involved him in
dangerous situations. He ‘was fired at by the North Vietnamese in Laos,
stoned by communists in Sumatra, chased out of Cambodia, and, in
Java, he found himself caught between rioting students and a charging
palace guard, who bayoneted his driver in the mouth’.45 In the summer
of 1967 he got involved in one perilous situation too many: he was shot
in the head and killed by an Israeli soldier whilst filming a scoop
editorial on the Six-Day War. The year before he made The Science of
Spying, he produced an eerily prescient documentary for NBC entitled
Vietnam: It’s a Mad War (1964) that presaged the impending disaster in
Southeast Asia. He was one of the first mainstream American journal-
ists seriously to question some of the fundamental tenets of US Cold
War foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, his decision to make a film about
US covert activity deeply troubled the CIA.
The Agency first learnt about the documentary a few months before
it aired when Frank Wisner, former overseer of CIA covert action as
head of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) during the ‘golden
age’, met Yates at a dinner party in Georgetown. Wisner became
alarmed when Yates, who presumably had imbibed a few beverages by
then, began provocatively revealing details of the film to Wisner and his
wife. He recited to Wisner the list of charges levelled against the Agency
by Wise and Ross in The Invisible Government, published the previous
year. In particular, their thesis that the CIA created foreign policy
independently of the President seemed to have inspired Yates’s interest
in the subject of covert action. Wisner grew increasingly anxious as
Yates’s wife extolled the virtues of Graham Greene’s The Quiet Ameri-
can for its exposure of American wrongdoing. Wisner bit his tongue as
best he could, but his wife, Polly, tried to rebut some of the more
damaging accusations in The Invisible Government. Yates grew irritated
and ‘told her in no uncertain terms that he was very sure of his facts
because he had talked with Messrs. Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell,
44 ‘Memorandum for the DCI’, 11 July 1963, CREST, CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090034-3.
45 Tom Mascaro, ‘Overlooked: Ted Yates, Bob Rogers, and Vietnam: It’s a Mad War’, 24 July
2014, <http://64.40.154.41/bea2002/papers/mascaro.pdf>.
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among others, and that these were people who obviously knew the
inside story’.
Feeling a little betrayed by his former boss, a stunned Wisner called
to investigate Yates’s claims. Dulles admitted that Yates had come to
see him, but that he only agreed to be interviewed after Yates reassured
him that the documentary would ‘refute and rebut many of the unfair
and inaccurate charges which had been made against the Agency’.
Wisner told Dulles that his ‘distinct impression’ was they ‘are intending
to do the exact reverse of what they have claimed, and that for some
reason not clear to me they have got the hatchet out’. An enraged
Wisner got in touch with Richard Helms, the future head of the CIA
who was then working in Wisner’s former position overseeing CIA
covert operations as Deputy Director of Plans (DDP). Helms believed
the issue serious enough to merit the attention of DCI John McCone.
Wisner sent McCone a long letter explaining the encounter and warned
that ‘unless checked or restrained in some manner their program will
do very serious additional damage to the reputation and standing of the
Agency.’ Perhaps, Wisner added, it would be possible ‘to point out to
their superiors in NBC the sort of damage that could result to the
national interest from a nationwide, hour-long, feature television
broadcast containing inaccuracies, distortions and the perpetuation
of the ugly myths, many of which are demonstrably Communist in
origin’.46
If McCone did contact NBC, they obviously weren’t listening. The
documentary aired on 4 May 1965 in prime time. Though the Agency
failed to get it pulled, the controversial content of the programme was
enough to provoke the show’s sponsors, tyre-manufacturers B. F.
Goodrich, to pull their support.47 One of B. F. Goodrich’s trustees was
Langbourne Williams, a close friend of Allen Dulles who had urged the
Agency to take action against Castro in the run-up to the Bay of Pigs
invasion; Williams was head of the Freeport Sulphur company which
was driven out of Cuba following the revolution.48 It is unclear from the
documentary record whether Williams was approached by the Agency
about The Science of Spying, or indeed whether he was involved in B. F.
Goodrich’s decision to pull their support from the show. The company’s
explanation was that they feared it might harm the United States Gov-
ernment.49 In keeping with the understanding of US Cold War ideology
46 Frank G. Wisner to John McCone, 4 March 1965, Allen W. Dulles MSS, Series 1 Correspon-
dence, Box 19 Folder 6, ‘Frank G. Wisner correspondence’, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library,
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
47 Val Adams, ‘Goodrich Calls N.B.C. View of Program Too Broad, New York Times, 6 May
1965.
48 Allen W. Dulles to Langbourne M. Williams, 16 April 1960, CREST, CIA-
RDP80B01676R003700110101-0; David Hein, Nobel Powell and the Episcopal Establishment in the
Twentieth Century (Eugene, 2001), p. 143, n. 109.
49 Val Adams, ‘Goodrich Calls N.B.C. View of Program Too Broad, New York Times, 6 May
1965.
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as a system endorsed and perpetuated by a ‘state–private network’ of
dutiful citizens who wilfully advocated a consensus vision of American
foreign policy without interference or direction from the US govern-
ment, it is likely that Goodrich would have taken the same decision
whether or not any prompting by the CIA had occurred.50
The Science of Spying repeated many of the charges from Wise and
Ross’s book. Details of CIA activities in Iran, Guatemala, Vietnam,
and, of course, the Bay of Pigs, were included. The filmmakers intercut
each segment with tacit acknowledgements from Bissell and Dulles, who
politely did not deny these operations, which was as good as an official
admission. In fairness to Yates, it turned out to be far more balanced
than Wisner had predicted, and Dulles and Bissell both gave convincing
performances in rebutting their critics. ‘Intelligence is nothing really
other than information and knowledge’, instructed the ever-affable
Dulles. ‘The idea that it is necessarily nefarious, that it’s always engaged
in overthrowing governments, that’s false’, and with a dismissive hand-
gesture he reiterated ‘that’s for the birds’. ‘Now there are times,’ he
added, growing more serious, ‘there are times when the United States
government feels that the developments in another government, such as
the Vietnam situation, is of a nature to imperil the safety and security
and the peace of the world, and asks the Central Intelligence Agency to
be its agent in that particular situation.’ ‘Mr. Dulles’, NBC’s John
Chancellor interjected, eliciting a response to Wise and Ross’s charges,
‘there are people who say that we, with regard to the CIA, are waging
a secret war with an invisible government.’ Dulles leaned into the
camera with a furrowed brow, his voice a little raspy from laryngitis,
‘May I say this, and I do it with all solemnity: At no time has the
CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence activity that
was not approved at the highest level.’51 Bissell also dismissed Wise and
Ross for making a convenient scapegoat out of the Agency:
Those who believe the US Government on occasion resorts to force when
it shouldn’t, should in all fairness and justice, direct their views to the
question of national policy, and not hide behind the criticism that
whereas the President and cabinet generally are enlightened people, there
is an evil and ill-controlled agency which imports this sinister element into
US policy.
As in The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles, both Bissell and Dulles in
The Science of Spying were on message in emphasizing presidential
responsibility for covert action.
50 See for example Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union,
1945–56 (Manchester, 1999); Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (eds), The US Government, Citizen
Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network (London, 2006); Wilford, The Mighty
Wurlitzer.
51 Allen Dulles to Lawrence P. Bachman, 17 May 1965, Allen W. Dulles MSS, Series 2 – Writings,
Box 72 Folder 20 – The Secret Surrender, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Uni-
versity, Princeton, NJ.
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Chancellor also asked the pair searching questions about the morality
of the CIA’s covert activities. The CIA, unlike the KGB, Dulles notes,
did indeed apply exacting moral standards when carrying out opera-
tions. ‘[A]s far as I know we don’t engage in assassinations and
kidnappings and things of that kind’, remarked Dulles, perhaps
unaware of the assassination plots on Castro’s life under Mongoose,
authorized by Kennedy the day after he left the CIA. As the long 1960s
wore on, and further revelations of CIA nefariousness became public
knowledge, this sense of moral supremacy over the Soviets that Dulles
felt would be increasingly called into question, not least by spy fiction
writers like John Le Carré. ‘All I can say’, remarked Dulles, defensively,
‘is that I’m a parson’s son and brought up as a Presbyterian, maybe as
a Calvinist, maybe that made me a fatalist, I don’t know . . . But I hope
I have a reasonable moral standard.’ Chancellor and Yates were not
entirely convinced: ‘it’s a truism in our society that moral ends do not
justify immoral means’, Chancellor submitted to Bissell, ‘and yet you
and your colleagues in the CIA must on many occasions have had to
abandon that principle’. ‘I suppose that the way that people deal with
this’, replied Bissell, thoughtfully,
and the one that occurs most commonly historically, is warfare . . . in that
they feel a higher loyalty, and they act in obedience to that higher loyalty
. . . I think the morality of, shall we call it ‘the Cold War, is so infinitely
easier than almost any kind of hot war, that I never encountered this as
a serious problem.
Yet for every rebuttal from Bissell and Dulles, Yates and Chancellor
offered up the voice of their critics. Eugene McCarthy, for example, an
outspoken congressional critic of the CIA, endorsed The Invisible Gov-
ernment’s narrative by complaining of the near-total lack of oversight
over the Agency’s activities. Perhaps the most remarkable criticism of
America’s covert foreign policy in the documentary, however, came in
the form of an extended and uninterrupted interview with the leader of
the Guatemalan Revolutionary Movement, Marco Antonio Yon
Sosa. ‘One of the main reasons we went to the mountains to begin our
struggle’, he told the NBC journalist, ‘was the presence of the United
States’, which was training anti-Castro Cuban mercenaries in their
country for the Bay of Pigs. ‘That is the one and only thing for which we
are grateful to the Central Intelligence Agency. If it were not for their
interference in Guatemala at that time, we might not be fighting in the
mountains today.’
‘Do you consider yourself a terrorist’, asked the interviewer after
detailing a number of attacks his insurgency had carried out against
American military and aid facilities.
Well we have to study very carefully the word terrorist . . . We attack [the
American military] not because they were Americans, but because of what
they are doing . . . We oppose United States policy in Guatemala because
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it is an interventionist policy – the Americans come here and put Presi-
dents in office and remove them . . .
The soldiers who died in their attacks, he concluded, ‘went into the
mountains’ twenty days previously, ‘and killed and tortured . . . and
raped a young girl in front of her whole family . . . So we have to do
something . . . It does not give us pleasure to destroy a truckload of
soldiers, but we must do these things to serve a higher purpose.’ Bissell’s
explanation for the morality of covert action had been given a prescient
example, but it was surely not the one he would have chosen. It was a
remarkable interview, in an equally remarkable programme: a landmark
moment in the history of the media’s relationship with America’s secret
government. Juxtaposing sharply with Eric Severaid’s sympathetic ques-
tioning of Dulles only a few years previously, The Science of Spying
demonstrated to Dulles that neither he, nor his former Agency, could
any longer rely upon the consensus journalism that had facilitated the
CIA’s so-called ‘golden age’ of covert action during Dulles’s tenure as
DCI.
IV
It was not just crusading journalists, however, who in the mid-1960s
began to challenge Dulles’s portrayal of the CIA, and especially his
guarded narration of the Bay of Pigs that held the President ultimately
responsible for the fiasco, and indeed the outcome of all covert actions.
After his death Kennedy’s aides set about constructing his politically
useful posthumous legacy and grew increasingly concerned that Dulles’s
account of the operation might tarnish the Camelot myth.52 In the
summer of 1965 Theodore Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. pub-
lished articles in Life and Look magazine that, as Dulles biographer
James Srodes writes, ‘portrayed a young, trusting president being
inveigled into the Zapata morass by a wily DCI and his cold warriors at
the agency’.53 Both of the articles were soon developed into book-length
biographies of Kennedy.54 As Srodes notes, Sorensen and Schlesinger’s
critiques of Dulles were partly antagonized by their belief ‘that Dulles
had betrayed Kennedy first’.55 In September 1961, before Dulles’s retire-
ment, his friend Charles J. V. Murphy, a Time-Life correspondent,
published an article in Fortune Magazine that criticized Kennedy’s
actions during the Cuban invasion. The White House, who tried to get
Henry Luce to stop the article’s publication, presumed Dulles had a
hand in his friend’s article. He had not – though Murphy ‘offered to
52 William Manchester, One Brief Shining Moment: Remembering Kennedy (Boston, 1983).
53 James Srodes, Alan Dulles: Master of Spies (Washington DC, 1999), p. 555.
54 Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965); Arthur M Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days:
John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York, 1965).
55 Srodes, Allen Dulles, p. 555.
SIMON WILLMETTS 183
© 2015 The Author. History published by The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
show Dulles a copy of the manuscript before publication . . . Dulles
wanted nothing to do with it.’56 Upset by Sorensen and Schlesinger’s
attacks, Dulles set about crafting his rebuttal, which he planned to
publish in Harper’s later that year. Dulles recalled his close friendship
with Kennedy, noting their shared affection for the James Bond novels.
He also condemned Schlesinger and Sorensen’s post factum analyses –
neither of them was privy to the pre-invasion discussions. Finally, as
Srodes writes, Dulles came as close as he ever would to criticizing
Kennedy himself:
Great actions require great determination. In these difficult types of
operations . . . one never succeeds unless there is a determination to
succeed, a willingness to risk some unpleasant political repercussions, and
a willingness to provide the basic military necessities. At the decisive
moment of the Bay of Pigs operation, all three of these essentials were
lacking.57
Dulles never published the article. Following his wife Clover’s interces-
sion, he came to the conclusion that it would be injudicious to launch
such a direct attack on America’s fallen king – the prospect of a former
CIA director seeking to overturn the Camelot myth was unlikely to
garner much sympathy with the American public even before the assas-
sination conspiracy theories that implicated the Agency had gone into
full swing. Nevertheless, he continued with the more Fabian public
relations strategy of stressing Presidential responsibility for covert
operations whilst not attacking Kennedy, or any President’s actions,
directly.
During the mid-1960s the consensus vision of the CIA that Dulles
had helped construct during the previous decade began to unravel. The
media grew increasingly recalcitrant in the face of the Agency’s contin-
ued requests for anonymity. In 1966, for example, The New York Times
published a five-part series on the CIA that journalist Harrison Salis-
bury described as ‘the first big venture by the Times into the journalism
of the late sixties’.58 Congress also grew increasingly vocal in its criti-
cisms of the Agency and its calls for a strengthened system of intelli-
gence accountability. In 1966, Senator Fulbright, one of the CIA’s most
vocal critics in Congress, and who unlike Sorensen and Schlesinger had
been privy to the pre-invasion discussions in the lead-up to the Bay of
Pigs, went on record to confirm Sorensen’s claim that Allen Dulles had
made ‘the case for intervention’ to Kennedy.59
Dulles continued, as before, to sell his former Agency, and coexten-
sively promote his own legacy. In 1966 he published a book-length
account of Operation Sunrise – arguably one of the OSS’s greatest
56 Ibid., p. 556.
57 Ibid., p. 557.
58 Harrison Salisbury cited in Prados, The Family Jewels, p. 197.
59 ‘C.I.A. Role Confirmed’, New York Times, 29 July 1966.
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wartime achievements as well as a personal triumph for Dulles who
led this operation that brought about the premature surrender of
German troops in northern Italy.60 A couple of years later he published
a compendium of true spy stories entitled Great True Spy Stories.61 The
collection ranged widely across space and time including an account by
Herodotus of Zopyrus’ deception of the Babylonians and, of course,
several accounts of George Washington’s use of spies during the Revo-
lutionary War. Dulles followed his compendium of true spy stories a
year later with a spy fiction anthology: Great Spy Stories from Fiction.62
This naturally incorporated excerpts from his friend Ian Fleming, but
also, perhaps surprisingly, included some of the more tenebrous fictive
visions of espionage with extracts from the likes of Maugham, Conrad,
Deighton, and even Greene and Le Carré!
Dulles also continued to make frequent TV appearances, often to
defend his increasingly embattled former Agency. In the wake of the
Ramparts Magazine revelations, for example, which revealed the CIA’s
covert sponsorship of the National Students’ Association (NSA) – an
operation whose beginning Dulles had overseen – Dulles appeared on
William F. Buckley’s Firing Line to answer this new wave of public
criticism of the Agency. Buckley, who had briefly served in the CIA
under E. Howard Hunt in the early 1950s, was one of the few journalists
in the late 1960s–early 1970s who could be consistently relied upon to
defend the CIA. In the 1970s, for example, he was so angered by the
public criticism of the Agency, and by the cynical portrayals of espio-
nage by spy novelists like Le Carré and especially Greene, that he began
writing a series of spy novels that centred on the espionage activities of
Blackford Oakes – an unambiguously heroic CIA agent. In another act
of defiant patriotism, Buckley, following the publication of the Penta-
gon Papers in 1971, published a series of ‘highly classified documents’ in
his conservative magazine, The National Review, which reflected the
Agency and the Pentagon in a positive light. When journalists ques-
tioned the authenticity of the ‘documents’, Buckley was forced to admit
that the whole thing was a hoax, and that the documents ‘had
been dreamed up “ex nihilo, (from nothing) in the offices of National
Review.”’63
Buckley’s line of questioning of Dulles in the December 1967 edition
of Firing Line largely resembled Eric Severaid’s from half a decade
previously. When he finally got to the thorny issue of covert action, and
in particular, the National Students’ Association scandal – deplored by
sections of the American media – Dulles grew increasingly obstinate:
‘What, what’s deplored? Deplored that you’re trying to get information,
say about Russian missiles. Is that widely deplored? About the Russian
60 Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender (New York, 1966).
61 Allen Dulles (ed.), Great True Spy Stories (New York, 1968).
62 Allen Dulles (ed.), Great Spy Stories from Fiction (New York, 1969).
63 ‘As we see it: Buckley “fake” papers an indefensible deceit’, Detroit Free Press, 23 July 1971.
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military posture, is that widely deplored? About Russia’s intentions, is
that deplored?’64 Buckley questioned why the NSA could not have
received its money from private sources like the Ford Foundation – a
proposal that Dulles said would not have been possible at that time –
‘they don’t like to get into governmental things’, he retorted. (The irony,
or straight up deception in what Dulles was saying, of course, was that
the CIA had indeed used the Ford Foundation as a conduit to channel
funds into various groups and cultural fronts during the Cold War.)65
As Buckley pushed his line of questioning on the NSA scandal further,
Dulles returned to his standard response to all criticisms of CIA covert
operations: they were all approved ‘at the highest level’ by the President
and the National Security Council – ‘They weren’t just invented in a
little shop [at] CIA.’66
Once the singular authority on matters pertaining to American espio-
nage and the CIA, by the end of his life Dulles had become one voice
among many. Indeed, by the late 1960s fewer and fewer people were
prepared to listen to him, or to accept the earnestness of his commen-
tary. As the decade wore on, his voice began to be drowned out by the
cacophony of criticism of his former Agency from an increasingly com-
bative American press. If, as Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones claims, Dulles’s
greatest achievement as Director of the CIA up until the Bay of Pigs
was that ‘he kept America on his side’, then it was only because America
was prepared to listen to him, and because few in the media challenged
him.67
Symptomatic of Dulles’s increasingly marginalized status, was his
failure to get a film adaptation of The Secret Surrender made. In the
1950s filmmakers and television producers were falling over themselves
to try and make semi-documentary features about the CIA and/or the
OSS in cooperation with the Agency.68 Dulles’s account of Operation
Sunrise was hot property during the age of consensus. Such requests for
governmental assistance, however, with the exception of a series of OSS
films released in 1947 that were made with the assistance of numerous
former OSS officers, including Dulles, were invariably denied. But in the
late 1960s, following years of failed negotiations, Dulles could not find
a single major studio willing to make the Secret Surrender into a motion
picture. Dulles even enlisted the help of Louis De Rochemont and Joy
and Halas Batchelor, who had made the CIA-sponsored adaptation of
George Orwell’s Animal Farm in 1954, to try to get Secret Surrender
64 Is there a need for central intelligence?’, Firing Line No. 80 transcript, 14 Dec. 1967, The
Hoover Institute [webpage], <http://hoohila.stanford.edu/firingline/programView2.php?programID
=100> [accessed 10 Nov. 2014].
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66 ‘Is There a Need for Central Intelligence’, Firing Line No. 80 transcript, 14 Dec. 1967, p. 14.
67 Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, p. 117.
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made. But De Rochemont and the Batchelors had produced their anti-
communist adaptation of Orwell’s fable at a time when HUAC’s
shadow loomed large over Hollywood – when no cinematic representa-
tion of the FBI could be produced without J. Edgar Hoover’s prior
approval, and when, as one television executive put it, aptly summing
up the media’s position on US covert action, ‘Officially our government
has no foreign espionage system in peacetime.’69 When Dulles finally did
realize the value of Hollywood publicity for his beleaguered former
Agency in his retirement (he had on numerous occasions declined the
opportunity to work with Hollywood on films about the Agency whilst
he was DCI), countercultural anti-authoritarianism in films like Bonnie
and Clyde (1967) and Easy Rider (1969) was in vogue. ‘[T]hose movie
executives who buy books, plays and other properties’, a defeated De
Rochemont was forced to admit in 1968, ‘men who actually decide what
pictures are to be made – never showed serious interest in THE
SECRET SURRENDER.’70
V
Those fissures, first apparent in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs
debacle, had, by the end of the 1960s, split open the American Cold War
consensus. In the process of that socio-political fragmentation, the CIA
lost control of its own narrative. Allen Dulles could no longer position
himself as the final word on intelligence matters – and throughout the
1960s he found his authoritative subject position increasingly undercut
by a progressively sceptical American media. The CIA preferred draco-
nian measures, but most of their attempts at censorship, tellingly, failed.
Though this ‘age of fracture’, as Daniel Rodgers has termed it, is tra-
ditionally dated from the end of the 1960s – specifically, in the wake of
the 1968 Tet offensive that galvanized the anti-war movement – the Bay
of Pigs was its crucible. That first great public disaster for American
Cold War foreign policy provoked a typically compliant media to begin
to question both the efficacy and morality of US foreign policy, a
substantial portion of which – as the Bay of Pigs made apparent – was
conducted in secret. The consensus did not immediately collapse – it
would take several more major foreign policy disasters, and in particu-
lar the tragedy of Vietnam, before its edifice crumbled. But the Bay of
Pigs began the process of questioning US foreign policy – of pointing
out the gap between reality and the official story, and of penetrating the
mythologies that had hitherto gilded American foreign policy, and in
69 Michael Kackman, Citizen Spy: Television Espionage and Cold War Culture (Minneapolis,
2005), p. 17.
70 Louis de Rochemont to John Halas and Joy Batchelor, 29 Sept. 1968, Louis De Rochemont
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particular, the activities of the CIA. ‘After the Bay of Pigs, nothing was
the same.’71
Dulles didn’t live long enough to witness the near-complete destruc-
tion of the Cold War consensus, and his beloved former Agency’s
reputation along with it. He died on 29 January 1969. Had he lived long
enough to see the CIA’s humiliation at the hands of The New York
Times and a series of presidential and congressional committees in 1975,
he would most likely have continued to appear on television and write
books to defend his former Agency. He would have stridently rejected
Senator Church’s characterization of the CIA as a ‘rogue elephant’ in
American government by maintaining his defence that the President was
ultimately responsible for all covert operations. It is also likely that he
would have found his arguments increasingly challenged by the Ameri-
can media, or worse still, he would have found himself ignored.
71 DeLillo, Libra, p. 22.
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